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Abstract—Modern embedded technology is a driving factor in satellite
miniaturization, contributing to a massive boom in satellite launches and
a rapidly evolving new space industry. Miniaturized satellites, however,
suffer from low reliability, as traditional hardware-based fault-tolerance (FT)
concepts are ineffective for on-board computers (OBCs) utilizing modern
systems-on-a-chip (SoC). Therefore, larger satellites continue to rely on
proven processors with large feature sizes. Software-based concepts have
largely been ignored by the space industry as they were researched only
in theory, and have not yet reached the level of maturity necessary for
implementation. We present the first integral, real-world solution to enable
fault-tolerant general-purpose computing with modern multiprocessor-SoCs
(MPSoCs) for spaceflight, thereby enabling their use in future high-priority
space missions. The presented multi-stage approach consists of three FT
stages, combining coarse-grained thread-level distributed self-validation,
FPGA reconfiguration, and mixed criticality to assure long-term FT and
excellent scalability for both resource constrained and critical high-priority
space missions. Early benchmark results indicate a drastic performance
increase over state-of-the-art radiation-hard OBC designs and considerably
lower software- and hardware development costs. This approach was de-
veloped for a 4-year European Space Agency (ESA) project, and we are
implementing a tiled MPSoC prototype jointly with two industrial partners.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern embedded technology is a driving factor in satellite minia-
turization, contributing to a massive boom in satellite launches and a
rapidly evolving new space industry. Micro- and nanosatellites (100-1kg)
have become increasingly popular platforms for a variety of commercial
and scientific applications, due to an excellent balance of performance
and cost. However, this class of spacecraft suffers from low reliability,
discouraging its use in long, complex, or high-priority missions. The on-
board computer (OBC) related electronics constitute a much larger share
of a miniaturized satellite than they do in larger satellites. Thus, per
component, they must deliver drastically better performance and consume
less energy. Therefore, and due to cost considerations, miniaturized
satellite OBCs are generally based upon processors with considerably
finer feature size, such as those developed for mobile embedded devices.
Traditional hardware-based fault-tolerance (FT) concepts for general-
purpose computing, however, are ineffective for modern, highly scaled
systems-on-chip (SoCs), becoming a prime source of malfunctions
aboard miniaturized satellites [1]. Larger satellites, too, are limited by the
measures traditionally used to assure FT for space applications, as these
prevent larger satellites from harnessing the benefits of modern proces-
sors designs, and multiprocessor-SoCs (MPSoCs). Also, these hardware-
based FT-measures can not handle varying performance requirements
during multi-phased missions and mega-constellations [2]. Software-
based FT measures rapidly evolved due to efforts of the scientific
community, and are effective for modern embedded hardware. However,
these advances have largely been ignored by the space industry as they
were researched only in theory, but rarely designed to be implemented.
While many of these concepts include innovative ideas, major imple-
mentation obstacles and fundamental issues remain unaddressed. Often,
prior research makes impractical assumptions towards the platform or
application environment, ignores fault detection, recovery from fail-over,
or other real-world constraints. Many concepts also attempt to uphold
safety and availability, e.g., for atmospheric aerospace use, but not
computational correctness. To the best of our knowledge, no integral
and practical solution to utilizing modern MPSoC-based systems within
high-priority space missions has been developed to date.
There is a wide gap between academic research towards novel FT
concepts and their practical application in spacecraft OBCs. Satellite
computers for control purposes are still largely based upon architectures
developed decades ago, while theoretical research has not achieved the
level of maturity necessary to bridge this gap. Thus, neither traditional
hardware- nor software-based FT solutions could offer all the functional-
ity necessary to improve the reliability of state-of-the-art embedded SoCs
in miniaturized satellite OBCs. Other concepts promise excellent FT
guarantees in theory, but require complex architectures that often do not
address the specific challenges of computers flying in space. Innovations
are especially needed in general-purpose computing, as OBCs must
execute a broad variety of applications efficiently. The presented research
addresses these challenges and our main contributions are:
• the first non-intrusive, integral, flexible, software-side approach en-
abling the use of modern MPSoCs for spaceflight meeting real-world
constraints;
• an approach not based upon custom or proprietary FT-processor cores,
does not require radiation-hard ASICs, or non-standard functionality;
• which can be implemented with standard toolchains, commercial off
the shelf (COTS) components, library IP, and little manpower;
• an introduction to an FPGA-based MPSoC architecture developed as
an ideal platform for our approach.
This approach was developed for a 4-year European Space Agency
(ESA) project with two industrial partners. Due to the interdisciplinary
nature of this project, other aspects of this approach and its hardware
implementation will be presented in separate publications.
In the next two sections, we will outline the challenges faced in
the space environment, and related work. Section IV contains a brief
overview of the multi-stage approach, its limitations, terminology, as
well as the application model and requirements. Each stage is described
in the subsequent sections, with the supervision concept explained in
Section V-D. Section VIII then introduces briefly an MPSoC architecture
specifically designed as a platform for this FT concept. Performance
and checkpoint reliability are discussed in Section IX, followed by
conclusions.
II. THE SPACE ENVIRONMENT
Solar cells are the main power source aboard modern spacecraft.
A spacecraft’s orbit, location and orientation (attitude) relative to the
Sun, and the solar array’s temperature all influence the efficiency of its
solar array. Miniaturized satellite’s have comparably small solar arrays
with strongly fluctuating output, and their OBCs are limited to a few
Watts of power-budget. Mid-mission physical access to spacecraft is
impossible, and historically servicing missions were conducted only on
rare occasions for satellites of outstanding importance in low-Earth orbit
(LEO). Signal-travel times, limited communication windows, and scarce
bandwidth make live-interaction with a spacecraft impractical. Thus,
faults detected during a satellite mission must be resolved unattended,
remotely, and fully autonomously. The drastically different fault-model,
mass, size, physical stress, and thermal design constraints in space [3]
prevent the re-use of FT-, debugging-, and testing approaches developed
for ground application.
High-energy particles are the predominant cause for faults within
OBCs [4]. They travel along the Earth’s magnetic field-lines in the
Van Allen belts, are ejected by the Sun during Solar Particle Events,
or arrive as Cosmic Rays from beyond our solar system. In LEO, the
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residual atmosphere and Earth’s magnetic field provide some protection
from radiation, but this absorption effect diminishes quickly with altitude.
Hence, microelectronics are exposed to a mix of highly charged particles,
with flux density depending on solar activity and the spacecraft’s attitude.
They can corrupt logical operations, induce bit-flips within data-storage
cells and connecting circuitry, or cause displacement damage (DD).
The impact of radiation on different microfabrication processes, sub-
strates, and memory technologies varies. In general, electronics with a
large feature size are more resilient to radiation-induced single event
effects (SEEs) than those manufactured in finer production nodes. Highly
scaled chips are susceptible to multi-bit upsets, propagating within
circuits corrupting groups of circuits or memory cells. The increased
impact of radiation effects on finer feature size chips also prevents better
protection through more circuit-level protection.
Radiation events can also cause single event functional interrupts
(SEFIs), affecting sets of circuits, individual interfaces, or even entire
chips. In general, the effects of SEEs and SEFIs can be transient or
permanent and accumulative, while DD is always permanent [5]. The
accumulative nature of permanent faults implies accelerated and often
spontaneous ageing, which must be handled efficiently throughout the
entire mission, sometimes as long as 10+ years.
The many challenges described in this section imply severe constraints
to an OBC, but besides radiation, many can be tackled through wise
engineering decisions and a smart system design. Radiation challenges
OBC fault-coverage constantly and throughout a mission and affects all
of an OBC’s components depicted in Figure 1. Radiation may corrupt
the results of processed instructions, register content and data stored
in caches, main memory, and non-volatile memory. Thus, not only
application data is prone to data corruption, but faults can also affect all
OS meta-data and kernel structures. Memory mainly suffers from bit-rot
and malfunctions in controller logic, and for volatile memory, these can
well be compensated for using error correcting codes (ECC) combined
with error scrubbing. Non-volatile memory (green) also requires more
powerful erasure coding systems, the basic notions of which also exist
in latest-generation COTS flash memory based devices. Functional inter-
rupts can also result in individual process cores or logic units (yellow)
failing temporarily or permanently. Data can also be corrupted in transit,
e.g. while being transferred or due to upsets in peripheral interface
controllers. Hence, from developer perspective, to-be executed software
and data can only be considered fault free if it resides exclusively in
radiation-hard memory and radiation-hard processing logic throughout.
As this is not the case with all but trivial processing logic, no part of an
OS can be relied upon to be fault-free, and concepts requiring such an
entity do not offer effective fault-coverage in the space environment.
III. RELATED WORK
Traditionally, FT is enabled through circuit-, RTL-, core-, and OBC-
level voting, which is costly to develop, difficult to validate, maintain,
and slow to evolve [6]–[11]. Software takes no active part in fault-
mitigation, as faults are suppressed at the circuit level, preventing the
effective assessment of a processor’s health. Circuit- and RTL-voting
are effective for microcontrollers and very small SoCs, while core-level
voting requires logic unavailable in COTS systems. Modern embedded
COTS MPSoCs consume very little energy. But to achieve FT using
hardware-side measures, arrays of synchronized high-frequency voters
or core-lockstepping in hardware are necessary. As voting and core-
level lockstepping at GigaHertz clock rates is non-trivial, it has been
implemented only at considerably lower frequencies with non-COTS
hardware [9], [11]–[13]. In general, hardware-voting based MPSoC
designs are static and non-adaptive, as the entire design’s fault-coverage
properties are highly chip specific [14]. All these components are single-
vendor solutions, therefore implying walled-garden environments. FT
MPSoCs for space use contain retrofitted TMRed single-core processors,
e.g. [7], or are unique, experimental solutions for specific satellite
missions [15], [16]. In contrast to these solutions, modern MPSoCs also
Fig. 1. A component-wise view of a satellite OBC. Volatile memory (blue) and
non-volatile memory (green) can well be protected using erasure coding. The
presented multi-stage approach covers faults affecting processor logic (yellow).
allow considerably more software design freedom due to the available
compute resources, thereby reducing the required development time
and complexity. For scientific instrumentation and low-priority Cube-
Sat missions, COTS-based MPSoCs and FPGA-SoC-hybrids have been
utilized, but these are not suitable for critical satellite control applications
within miniaturized satellites [17]. Ground-based FT applications do
not consider the specific threat-scenario and application environment,
physical constraints, and thermal design constraints [3], [5]. Instead, we
propose to use software-side functionality to assure FT for conventional,
non-fault tolerant processor cores.
First concepts involving coarse-grained lockstepping are promising
[18]–[20], but do not address the specific challenges to FT in space
[21]. FT using thread-level very-long-instruction word architectures [22],
[23] has also been explored, though the approach still requires pipeline-
level voters in hardware. Most implement checkpoint & rollback or
restart, which makes them unsuitable for spacecraft command & control
applications [24], others ignore fault-detection [25], [26], or require
external, infallible fault detection entities with deep knowledge about
application-intrinsics [27] but no concept of how this could be obtained.
Often, faults are assumed to be isolated, side-effect free and local to
an application [28] and/or transient [19], [20], [25], which voids their
effectiveness for space applications. Many prior concepts entail high
performance- [29], resource-overhead [30], [31], or impose severe design
constraints on applications and the OS [18], [19]. To be effective in the
space environment, an FT approach must be based upon forward-error-
correction and the implementation complexity must be low, and must be
suitable for general-purpose computing and impose little or no constraints
on the application software. Changes to the OS infrastructure must be
platform portable, code-wise localized, and individually verifiable.
[19], [20], [28] implement voting through OS invasive measures, can
not handle multi-threaded applications and consider the OS and stored
program code to be fault free. [21] requires no modifications to the
application software whatsoever, but can only assure availability in a
networked application architecture. An acceptance of these constraints
does not allow for adequate FT in a space mission scenario, and thus we
propose that application and OS instance must be able to fail arbitrarily
without impacting the residual system. In this case, fault propagation
between application instances also becomes a non-issue. Considerable
research has been directed towards FT real-time scheduling and mixed
critical software-FT systems, though only at a theoretical level [32]–[34].
As a consequence, no implementable, software-driven FT concept for
modern embedded- and mobile-market MPSoCs in space exists, creating
a gap between the described prior research on software- and hardware-FT
26th IEEE Asian Test Symposium 2017, 27-30 Nov 2017, Taipei City, Taiwan DOI: TBD, c© 2017 IEEE
based implementations.
IV. BRIDGING THE GAP: OUR APPROACH
This approach consists of three fault-mitigation stages:
Stage 1 is implemented entirely in software and provides fault-detection
through coarse-grained lockstepping to enable self-testing, and
can be implemented in COTS MPSoCs.
Stage 2 improves medium-term reliability, and enables long-term fault-
coverage through FPGA reconfiguration and the use of alterna-
tive configuration variants. It utilizes Stage 1’s fault detection
capabilities.
Stage 3 extends the lifetime of a degraded OBC by utilizing mixed
criticality to assure fault-coverage for high-criticality threads.
It enables the OBC to automatically sacrifice performance or
fault-coverage of lower-criticality threads in favor of higher-
critical applications, thereby maintaining a stable core system.
The presented concept is flexible and the individual stages are modular,
as Stage 2 or 3 can be omitted depending on the OBC and mission. Our
approach is designed for generic COTS MPSoCs, as these are readily
available in a variety of performance classes at low cost. The tiled
architecture described in Section VIII is optional but can be considered
as an ideal platform. In MPSoCs without a tiled architecture, tile can be
substituted for processor core, and the differences in fault coverage are
discussed in Section VIII.
Terminology: Fault detection in our approach is based upon sets of
tiles running two or more lockstepped copies of application threads. We
refer to such a group of lockstepped threads as a thread group. Timing-
compatible thread groups can be combined and executed on the same set
of tiles, and are then referred to as a tile group. A tile group periodically
executes a checkpoint routine, which computes checksums for all active
threads and compares them with the other tiles in the group (siblings),
thereby enabling a majority decision. The time between checkpoints (the
checkpoint frequency) is defined by the threads in a tile group and can be
modified at runtime. All lockstepping-relevant information is stored in
validation memory, a tile-dedicated memory segment which is read-only
accessible by tiles.
Application Requirements: The OS only has to support interrupts,
wake-up timers, and a multi-threading capable scheduler. To the best
of our knowledge, such functionality is available in most widely-used
RT- and general-purpose OS implementations. Virtual memory support
is required to enable performance-efficient multi-threading. Furthermore
virtual memory drastically simplifies thread-management, context switch-
ing, and thread isolation, benefiting overall fault-tolerance.
The only requirement for applications is interruptibility at application-
defined points in time, during which checkpoints can be executed. As
there is no efficient, uniform approach to assess the health of threads, we
rely upon applications assessing their own health-state. A thread provides
four callback routines, which are executed during tile initialization and
by the checkpoint handler:
• an initialization routine, to be executed on all tiles at bootup;
• a checksum callback, used to generate a checksum for comparison
with siblings,
• a synchronization callback, exposing all thread-state relevant data to
synchronize a sibling with a tile group; This data can either be placed
directly in the tile’s validation memory, or as a reference to structures
in main memory.
• and an update callback, which is executed on a tile that needs to
synchronize its state to a tile group.
Some of these callbacks may be omitted, e.g., for applications not requir-
ing bootstrapping or with an already exposed state. The checksum com-
putation and state (re)-synchronization are intentionally placed within
the domain of the application developer. This enables decisions about an
application state to be taken by the entity with the best knowledge of
the individual thread and the means to determine which data is relevant
to the system and application state, and must be preserved.
Threads can be executed in an arbitrary order within a lockstep cycle
as long as their state is equivalent during the next checkpoint. However,
interrupting an active application at a random point in time is usually
undesirable. We avoid thread-synchronization issues [18] by enabling the
application developer to define comparison points where the application
will yield control to the checkpoint handler. If an application requires
real-time scheduling, the tightness of the RT guarantees depends upon
the time required to execute these callbacks. Communication between
thread-groups and tile-groups is of course possible and will remain
reliable, as long as the receiving application is aware that it will receive
multiple message replicas. To prevent faults from propagating through
IPC channels, a thread can compare the received messages.
Limitations: This approach guarantees system state consistency and
control flow correctness after each checkpoint, and for all past check-
point periods. It also assures computational correctness before the last
checkpoint, but can not actively prevent faults from occurring during
the ongoing checkpoint cycle. Thus, if one tile experiences a fault,
incorrect results may be propagated outside the system, even though
the damage caused to the OBC will be corrected during the next check-
point, and system state consistency will be asserted. This limitation is
inherent to coarse-grained lock-stepping concepts, but could be elevated
at the thread-level somewhat using finer-grained event hooking, e.g.,
system-call hooking [19]. However, this workaround requires in-deep
modifications to the OS kernel and development toolchain, is thus non-
portable and difficult to maintain, while still not solving the underlying
conceptional limitation.
Related research, however, does show that a solution at the system-
design level is much better suited to prevent fault-propagation of transient
faults between checkpoints using simple I/O voting [21]. Traditional
hardware-FT approaches used in space computing are strong for as-
suring non-propagation of faults across interfaces using hardware-side
voting, but can not protect the control-flow and system-state consistency
efficiently. While the system state and system-level fault-tolerance are
assured by Stage 1, and long-term system resilience are safeguarded
in Stage 2 and 3, we can utilize simple I/O voting to prevent fault-
propagation for tile groups. Performing I/O voting on interface is already
common practice in space-borne computing, as considerable effort is
put into providing interface redundancy aboard larger satellites. Small
satellites, especially CubeSats, usually can not spare the additional
energy, space and mass required for interface replication. For such
spacecraft, I/O voting can be implemented on-chip using library IP.
V. STAGE 1: SHORT-TERM FAULT MITIGATION
Stage 1 offers software-controlled, thread-level, distributed majority
voting and fine-grained fault logging within any COTS MPSoC with three
or more processor cores. The objective of Stage 1 is to detect and correct
faults at each checkpoint to assure computational correctness, control-
flow consistency, and a consistent system state after each checkpoint. To
do so, Stage 1 requires a processor guaranteeing sequential consistency.
Instead of exerting direct control over the MPSoC, a supervisor
can assure FT indirectly, as fault-coverage and control are distributed
and enforced by the tiles themselves. In consequence, the supervisor
does not require any knowledge about the executed application threads,
an individual tile’s state, or other OBC intrinsics. The thread group
assignment within an MPSoC can be reconfigured freely at runtime to
implement different voting configurations. Thus, the described approach
can exploit parallelization to improve reliability, throughput, or minimize
power consumption, thereby allowing the system to adapt to multi-phased
missions with varying performance requirements.
A. Thread-Based Self-Testing
The program flow of this stage is depicted in Figure 2 and described
below. It can be implemented within an existing scheduler and an
interrupt service routine (ISR). A practical example for tile fault handling
and recovery, and an overview over how the supervisor interacts with the
system are provided at the end of this section.
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Fig. 2. The execution cycle of a tile during Stage 1. All code necessary for
implementation is highlighted in blue, callbacks in yellow.
Bootup & Initialization: After bootup, a tile first executes basic self-
test functionality to assure integrity of tile-local IP-cores and memory.
Each thread’s initialization routine is executed on all tiles to allow
more rapid state-update in case a new thread-group is added to a
tile. When being assigned to a tile, a thread will register its desired
checkpoint frequency and its checksum, synchronization and update
callback routines. After the threads have been initialized, each tile will
set a periodic timer to initiate checkpoints. As depicted in Figure 2, a
tile will execute its first checkpoint immediately after the MPSoC has
been fully rebooted, to assure that application and OS initialization were
successful. If only this individual tile was rebooted, it can thus return to
the spare tile pool to replace a faulty core in the future.
Checkpoint Start: A checkpoint is triggered by a timer interrupt or
externally by the supervisor. A thread can delay a checkpoint until it has
reached a viable state for checksum comparison by disabling interrupts,
thereby deferring interrupt processing. The checkpoint ISR saves the
existing system state, loads the actual checkpoint handler, performs a
context switch to kernel mode, and invokes the checkpoint handler.
Checksum Computation: The checkpoint handler invokes each active
thread’s checksum callback scheduled for checking. As not all threads
in a tile group require the same checking frequencies, not all active
threads will be validated during each checkpoint. This checksum callback
returns a representation of the application thread’s internal state as
checksum or hash generated from thread-private variables and other
internal application state. The checksum format is compile-time defined,
and must be chosen based on FT needs. The algorithm used to generate
this checksum is up to the application developer. Each checksum is
stored in the tile’s local validation memory and thereby exposed to the
other tiles. If no checkpoint routine can be provided, a checksum is
computed by the checkpoint handler for an application-defined memory
range. This memory range can be utilized by the application to deposit
state-relevant data passively, e.g., through linker scripts or pre-processor
macros. A non-continuously running application can also deposit its
results in validation memory or return a checksum upon exit.
Prior concepts required deep modifications to the OS to allow a
proprietary central health-management entity to retrieve this information
directly [18], [25], or utilized no application-internal information [20],
[21], [31]. Instead, this approach enables us to utilize application-
intrinsics to assess the health-state of the system, without requiring any
knowledge on the applications. The time required to generate checksums
can be minimized by adapting the application code, e.g., by retaining
computational by-products which would usually be discarded.
Checksum Comparison: Once all checksum callbacks have been
executed, a tile will monitor its group members’ validation memory
segments until another tile is ready for comparison. It will do so
until it has compared its checksums with all siblings, or the system
designer’s tile-group deadline expired. Tiles will usually begin comparing
its checksums with siblings immediately or wait only briefly, as delays
are mainly induced due to varying memory latencies or malfunctions. If
it detects a checksum mismatch or a sibling violated the deadline, the
tile will stop comparing checksums and report disagreement with that
tile to the supervisor.
Thread Disagreement & State Propagation: If a tile detected a
checksum mismatch, it executes the synchronization callback routines
for all threads in the affected tile group. This callback can be omitted
if all state-relevant data is already in validation memory, e.g. for non-
continuous running applications. The checkpoint routine will adjust the
checkpoint’s timer if a new thread group was added to the tile group,
and return control to the scheduler.
State Update and Thread Execution: The scheduler will check three
conditions during regular operation: if any thread-group is active, the
tile was newly added to a tile group, or requires an update. Idle tiles
sleep until the next checkpoint and can be woken up by the supervisor to
reduce energy consumption and fault-potential. In case a tile must update
a thread-group’s state from a sibling, the relevant update callback will be
executed for each thread. Tiles that have detected disagreement with one
of their siblings will delay execution for a tile-group-wide grace period,
to allow a sibling to retrieve a state-copy from validation memory. Once
a tile has updated its state using a sibling’s data, application processing
continues. The other tile group members will also wake up after the grace
period and continue executing threads. This concludes the lockstep cycle.
B. A Practical Example
Figure 3 depicts a quad-core MPSoC with a single tile group and
three members. A fault has occurred during the second lockstep cycle
on tile C2, which is subsequently replaced with the idle tile C3. C3 must
retrieve a copy of the state of its threads Ta and Tb from another valid
Fig. 3. Tile initialization and a complete Stage 1 lockstep cycle.
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sibling. The replaced tile, C2, can subsequently be tested for permanent
defects by the OS and the supervisor.
C. Checkpoint-Frequency, Timing & Real-Time Capabilities
The level of fault-coverage is mainly dependent on the checkpoint
frequency. During a checkpoint, the computationally most costly op-
erations are the application checksum callbacks, the synchronization
callbacks and a new tile’s update callback. Each of these operations
involves a context switch and may imply a varying level of data being
read or written. Thus, the performance overhead and fault-tolerance
capabilities are mainly based upon actual applications checked, as this
actual checkpoint handler code is rather trivial. In general, a higher
checkpoint frequency implies more time will be spent in checkpoints,
more fine-grained fault-detection are possible, thus better fault-coverage.
In our implementation, interrupts are deferred during a checkpoint,
thus applications are not serviced and will not process I/O, thereby
affecting the level of real-time capabilities the MPSoC can offer.
However, though this can be worked around using a more elaborate
interrupt handling concept, e.g., using interrupt prioritization or filtering.
Real-time capabilities are thus directly dependent on the MPSoC, and
application implementation characteristics, with the OS infrastructure
playing a minor role. For complex applications with a large state, a
lower checkpoint frequency however also implies a larger difference
in state. Hence, more data must be copied between tiles to achieve
thread-synchronization requiring additional time. Thus, a larger state
also requires more time for execution, potentially more complex data
structures, thereby implying longer synchronization- and update-callback.
Overall, the performance of OBCs executing less complex applications
with little state will improve with lower checking frequencies. For such
OBCs, more checkpoints imply more computational overhead. With more
complex applications, there is considerable optimization potential to find
a sweet-spot between checkpoint frequency and application-state size.
However, performance is strongly dependent assuring that high-quality
callback-routines are provided by the application developer.
D. Supervision
The supervisor is connected to the MPSoC through a multiplexed bus-
interface, where each line signals agreement with another tile. Finer-
grained disagreement reporting does not significantly improve fault-
coverage and constrains scalability of the MPSoC. As depicted in Figure
4, the supervisor only reacts to disagreement between tiles, otherwise
remaining passive. It maintains a fault-counter for each tile, and acts
as a system-reset inducing watchdog timer for the MPSoC. To resolve
transient faults within a tile, it increments the fault counter and induces
a state update through a low-level debug interface. After repeated faults,
the supervisor will replace the tile by adjusting the thread-mapping of
a spare tile, activating it, and rebooting the faulty tile. In case a system
developer indicated threshold is exceeded, the disagreeing tile is assumed
permanently defunct and not re-used as a spare. Stage 1 alone can not
reclaim defective tiles beyond programmatically avoiding the use of
defective peripherals, memory pages or processor functionality. Thus,
Stage 2 will attempt to repair tiles to prevent resource exhaustion.
In contrast to existing FT solutions, faults can be reported by each tile
individually, because fault detection is decentralized. As this functionality
is implemented at the kernel level, we can utilize the OS’s powerful
logging and diagnostics facilities, instead of relying upon the supervisor
to provide a minimal useful level of logging. Diagnostics can thus be
enriched with application-level information. Thereby, defect assessment
accuracy can be improved compared to prior FT-approaches, enabling
more sophisticated debugging without requiring live-interaction.
Our approach enables lockstepping frequencies far below the Kilo-
Hertz range, thus the supervisor will not be a bottleneck. Therefore,
high-performance MPSoCs can be well supervised using pre-existing
discrete COTS supervisors. COTS MPSoCs will utilize an external
supervisor, while ASIC, FPGA and FPGA-SoC-hybrid based MPSoCs
can implement this functionality in reconfigurable logic. An off-chip
Fig. 4. A tile’s and supervisor’s program-flow and their interactions. Stage 1, 2
and 3 logic are indicated in white, blue and yellow respectively.
supervisor can be used for active tile health-management and FPGA
reconfiguration, enabling the use of FPGA reconfiguration. See [35] for
further details on MPSoC to Supervisor communication.
VI. STAGE 2: TILE REPAIR & RECOVERY
The previous stage can compensate faults as long as healthy tiles
are available to replace defective tiles. In all existing hardware-side
FT implementations, resource exhaustion is mitigated through over-
provisioning (adding more spares). Over-provisioning of tiles naturally
is inefficient and curtails system scalability, but is certain due to the
static, unchangeable nature of existing ASIC based solutions. This will
inevitably result in resource exhaustion, and has not been solved in prior
work. Stage 2 is designed to perform active tile health management and
test, repair, validate and recover faulty tiles, thereby tackling this fun-
damental limitation. In FPGA-based systems transient faults can corrupt
the stored configuration of programmed logic, thus induce permanent
effects within the running configuration [36], [37]. However, even if a
logic cell is damaged permanently the residual highly-redundant FPGA
fabric will remain intact and can be re-purposed [38]. It could be repaired
with differently routed, functionally equivalent configurations.
The main issue preventing prior research from utilizing FPGA re-
configuration to increase FT of general purpose computing architectures
is a lack of non-invasive, flexible circuit level fault detection. As
efficient fault-detection is an unresolved issue and periodic configuration
scrubbing is slow, Stage 2 relies upon fault-detection by Stage 1. If a
tile was replaced by a spare, the supervisor’s Stage 2 logic recovers
tiles using partial reconfiguration, mapping a tile to one of multiple
partitions. Once reconfiguration is complete, the supervisor validates
the relevant partitions to detect permanent damage to the FPGA fabric.
Assuming a tiled MPSoC architecture (see Section VIII) is used, tiles
are self-contained by design. Thus, reconfiguration of just one tile will
not impact the other tiles and allow the OBC to recover a tile in the
background. If reprogramming was unsuccessful or fabric-level faults
persist, the supervisor will repeat the previous step with differently
routed configuration variants. Partially defective logic cells can be re-
purposed, while other cells can be avoided entirely, if no other usage is
possible. Other elements of the FPGA fabric can be treated equivalently.
As a final measure, faults within shared logic can be resolved using full
reconfiguration, briefly halting the MPSoC.
Stage 2 can also test different on-chip memories, the processor cores,
and peripheral controllers through external interconnect access ports (e.g.
an AXI-bridge). If the OBC is implemented on an ASIC or with a COTS
MPSoC, a widely available low-level debug and testing interface such as
JTAG can be utilized for the same purpose. For further details on how
this functionality can be implemented, see [39].
If a defunct tile can not be repaired through automated reconfiguration,
additional diagnostic information can be used for further analysis. The
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Fig. 5. If no healthy spare tiles are available, the Stage 3 can split defunct
tile groups and uphold FT guarantees for high-criticality threads. The necessary
adjustment to the checkpoint frequency on tile 2 is omitted for simplicity.
operator can utilize this information to conduct fault analysis on the
ground, to craft a suitable replacement configuration to avoid these areas.
Of course, this implies extreme development effort but for many higher-
priority space missions, the loss of a spacecraft may be more costly
than the engineering costs for saving the mission. If both partial- and
full-reconfiguration are unsuccessful and all spare resources have been
exhausted, the fault is escalated to Stage 3.
VII. STAGE 3: APPLIED MIXED CRITICALITY
Stage 3 utilizes thread-level mixed criticality to extend an OBC’s
lifetime once the previous stages have depleted all spare resources.
Its primary objective is to autonomously maintain system stability of
an aged or degraded OBC at short notice to avert loss-of-mission and
loss-of-subsystem, even if an OBC approaches the end of its lifetime.
The operator can then define a more resource conserving satellite
operations schedule, sacrifice link capacity, or on-board storage space.
Thus, dependability for high-criticality threads can be maintained by
reducing compute performance, throughput, or increasing latency of
lower-criticality applications.
The criticality of applications executed on an OBC can be differen-
tiated by the importance of the controlled subsystem or relevance for
commandeering the spacecraft. Performance degradation or even a loss
of lower-criticality tasks aboard a satellite is in general preferable to
a loss of system stability for key applications. As thread groups can be
added and removed from tile groups, and multiple tile groups can coexist
in the same MPSoC, individual threads can also be migrated between
tile groups [26]. Furthermore, the checkpoint frequency of a tile group
can be reduced to increase a tile’s computational capacity, or it can cease
servicing low-priority interfaces.
The supervision logic is extended to reallocate thread-groups across
the system based upon the thread’s priority. Hence, if Stage 2 failed
to reconfigure the OBC, the supervisor can generate new tile-group
assignments for threads with high priority and will attempt to retain
existing assignments. Eventually, all healthy tiles will be saturated with
threads, and no further assignments will be possible. Then, it can
either allocate more mappings, providing lower-priority threads with less
processing time to maintain availability, reduce the checking frequency,
or leave them inactive. The OBC developer can decide at design time,
which applications would benefit most from continuous operation with
reduced performance or reliability, and which can be forgone.
In Figure 5, initially two tile groups are executed on one MPSoC with
6 tiles. The green tile group consisting of a computationally expensive
low-criticality application Td and a shorter but more important thread
Tc. Tile 2 is member of another group, and has sufficient spare capacity
to accommodate Tc, but not Td. As no more spare tiles are available, the
lower-criticality task Td remains degraded, and can only detect but not
correct subsequent faults. Tc is migrated to a separate, new tile group
and executed on tiles 2 – 4, thereby maintaining strong FT.
VIII. PLATFORM ARCHITECTURE
Our multi-stage FT-approach is in principle platform independent and
can be implemented within any multi-threading capable OS supporting
interrupts and timers. For most COTS-MPSoC based nanosatellites in
a LEO orbit, stage 1-3 alone offer sufficient fault-coverage. Aboard
such spacecraft, MPSoC interfaces are either unprotected or protected
programmatically and outside the MPSoC (e.g. using EDAC chips or by
resolving SEFIs through power cycling). Aboard larger, more critical
spacecraft such faults can not be accepted, and OBC interfaces are
usually implemented redundantly at great effort. This redundancy is
inherent to our approach with tiled architectures, and we developed an
MPSoC platform capable of surviving the loss of peripheral devices and
permanent, non-resolvable defects in interfaces.
A. Architecture Overview
This MPSoC can completely be implemented in full using library IP
available with standard industry FPGA or ASIC design tools without
custom FT components. We have implemented our MPSoC prototype
with Xilinx Vivado standard IP, AXI Interconnects, for low-tier ARM
Cortex-A processor cores to be provided by one of our industrial partners.
For common space applications, size-optimized cores such as the Cortex-
A32, -A35 and A5 offer an excellent balance between performance, uni-
versal platform support and logic utilization. The architecture minimizes
shared logic, compartmentalizes tiles, and offers a clearly defined access
channel between tiles for sharing checkpoint-results and application-
state. We are aware that most miniaturized satellites do not require such
a high degree of fault-coverage, and often can not afford the added
hardware complexity and development effort.
The design depicted in Figure 6 follows a tiled architecture and
is implemented within an FPGA to counter resource exhaustion when
mitigating faults in Stage 2. It utilizes simple redundancy to compensate
for SEFIs, but does not contain radiation-hard or FT processor cores or
custom logic. Each tile is equipped with a processor core, an interrupt
controller (IRQ in the figure), a dedicated on-chip memory slice used
as validation memory, and several peripheral interfaces through the local
interconnect. Tiles are connected through an I/O memory management
unit (IOMMU) and a global interconnect to main- and non-volatile
memory. They can not access the local interconnect of other tiles to
prevent interference and minimize shared logic. This tiled architecture
benefits from partial reconfiguration, as tiles can be placed strategically
on an FPGA’s fabric along partition borders. Our approach and this
architecture support multi-FPGA and -ASIC MPSoCs without adaptation,
thereby improving scalability and resilience against FPGA-level SEFIs.
The ECC-protected dual-port validation memory in each tile holds the
current tile-status, thread assignments, as well as the checksums and state
information. One interface is connected to the tile’s local interconnect,
while the second port is read-only accessible via the global interconnect.
Fig. 6. A simplified representation of the presented MPSoC with memory
controllers highlighted in yellow, scrubbers in green, and interconnect in blue.
A dedicated interface on each tile allows supervisor access.
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The validation memory is inherently redundant, as threads are executed
on at least two tiles. The shared main memory is redundant to safeguard
from SEFIs affecting the tile-shared interface. Both instances are ECC
protected and connected to the global interconnect. The main memory is
split into several segments: each tile has write-access to its own segment,
and can read the global shared code segment. ECC-fault syndrome
interrupts for main memory are handled by the supervisor. We perform
error-scrubbing on these memories to avoid accumulating bit-flips due
to transient and permanent faults. The scrubbing frequency should be set
depending on the actually used memory technology, production node and
mission parameters. Non-volatile memory is implemented redundantly
as well. Our prototype is designed to utilize radiation immune MRAM
and PCM [3] to enable advanced FT data storage concepts [40], [41].
Each tile’s main memory segment, validation memory, and non-volatile
memory are mapped to the same tile-local address ranges. At the thread-
level, the address-space in each tile is thus identical, making application
and OS code location independent and allowing tiles to share binaries.
Further implementation details are available in [35].
B. FPGA Implementation & Utilization
We also have developed a community reproducible MPSoC design
based on the previously described architecture utilizing exclusively
library-IP. Instead of ARM cores, this 4-tile demonstration design in-
cludes Xilinx MicroBlaze processor cores, as these are more available to
the general public. It targets standard FPGA development boards and is
equipped with a single shared DDR4 main memory controller, and 2MB
on-chip BRAM program memory. This reduced design was implemented
successfully using the Xilinx Vivado Design Suite and Stage 1 was
implemented using FreeRTOS and using the Xilinx SDK toolchain. Each
tile is outfitted with data and instruction caches, an interrupt controller,
a UART interface, validation memory and an additional local memory
for storing tile-private information, and a GPIO controller to signal
agreement between tiles. All tile-local memories are equipped with ECC,
as this increases logic size of the relevant memory controllers, and
includes two additional interrupts for each connected memory. We could
achieved full timing closure at 250MHz core frequency on VCU118 and
KCU116 development kits, though the clock frequency was selected to
achieve a simple design, not an efficient or fast one. If additional time
was invested into timing optimization and clocking, the clock speed can
be drastically increased. Additional information regarding the tile and
SoC layout are available in [35].
Fabric utilization based upon the Xilinx Virtex VCU118 Development
Kit is depicted in Figure 7. Due to the use of on-chip program memory
and the DDR4 memory controller, BRAM utilization is inflated compared
to the MPSoC described previously. Resource utilization is indicated in
Table I, with more details given in [35]. Stage 2 and 3 do not require
additional FPGA logic.
This design’s very low logic usage shows that the architecture itself
can be scaled to 8 and more tiles comfortably, and most current-
generation FPGAs offer an abundance of unused resources for Stage
Resource Utilization Available Utilization %
LUT 68,705 1,182,240 5.81%
LUTRAM 9,235 591,840 1.56%
FF 92,536 2,364,480 3.91%
BRAM 810 2,160 37.48%
DSP 27 6,840 0.40%
IO 163 832 19.59%
BUFG 17 1,800 0.94%
MMCM 6 30 20.00%
Tab. I. Resource utilization of the 4-tile demonstration MPSoC on a Xilinx
VCU118 development board. The on-chip program memory and DDR4 memory
controller disproportionately inflate BRAM utilization.
Fig. 7. Logic placement of the demo-MPSoC on a VCU118 development board
running 4 Tiles: green, red, yellow, pink; Global Interconnect: white; Xilinx DDR4
controller: blue; Program Memory: teal.
2. With current-generation FPGA platforms, Stage 2 will thus not only
be able to recover defective tiles using spare resources, but could even
place multiple tiles as cold or hot spares. The Microblaze cores utilized
here for demonstration purposes can directly be replaced with drastically
more complex processor cores, assuming the necessary peripheral IP is
added as well (e.g. an ARM GIC instead of the MicroBlaze Interrupt
Controller).
IX. DISCUSSION & OUTLOOK
The reliability of each individual tile’s voting decision can be weak,
and an individual tile can report false (dis)agreement with its siblings.
Our approach takes into account that any software or hardware compo-
nent associated within a tile can fail arbitrarily. Such failure is mitigated
through a distributed decision, which is taken based on each tile’s
perspective of its siblings. Thus, this approach does not require the
checksum logic to compute correctly, and we assume that faults may
occur at any time during the lifetime of a tile. As tile groups usually
consist of three or more tiles, the likelihood of false-disagreements or
non-reported disagreement is insignificant. To mask such a fault, multiple
faults would have to coincide in a majority of tiles within the same
tile group during a single checking period and induce the same fault.
The probability for such an event is extremely low, except at very high
radiation levels. Even in such situations, such faults would be detected
after the subsequent checkpoint with near certainty.
Prior research proves the conceptual effectiveness of thread-based FT
[9], [20] and software-based FT combined with simple I/O voting [21].
Also, the detailed FT capabilities of a platform utilizing our approach
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are influenced by the actually used FPGA, ASIC or COTS-MPSoC
design. These imply mainly design decisions and a varying acceptance of
single-points-of-failure. Schedulability, timing conformity, and deadlock-
avoidance have been extensively researched in literature, e.g., in [30].
Thus, what remains to be shown is the runtime performance overhead
induced by the presented approach, as the main objective of our research
is to enable the efficient use of high-performance mobile-market COTS
MPSoCs within satellite computers. To achieve worst-case performance
estimations, we developed a naive, unoptimized implementation of the
Stage 1 of our approach, as the others do not affect the runtime
performance of the MPSoC. This naive implementation shows a median-
best performance degradation of 9% and median-worst degradation of
26% on tiles with a single processor core. Further information on the
conducted tests is available in [35], as well as performance measurements
for 6 different application scenarios modelled after the NASA/James
Webb Space Telescope’s Mid-Infrared Instrument (MIRI) [42].
As prior thread-level FT implementations [19], [20], [28] are based
upon fundamentally different concepts, only address transient faults
within a very limited scope, and are deeply embedded into proprietary
OS, their fault-coverage and performance can not be directly compared.
However, the measured performance overhead does fall within the same
range as measured in [19], and we also observe comparable average-
case performance. To put these measurements into context, even a 50%
slowdown on modern MPSoCs will offer a factor-of-5 performance in-
crease over state-of-the-art radiation-hardened processor designs, thereby
showing a favourable cost-vs-benefit trade-off.
X. CONCLUSIONS
In this contribution, we present the first practical and integral multi-
stage approach to fault-tolerant (FT) general purpose computing for
spaceflight use. The approach explicitly does not utilize radiation-
hardened or hardware-FT processor cores and utilizes no central MPSoC-
internal voting logic. It can thus be implemented within COTS MPSoCs
or alternatively entirely with non-FT, standard library IP-cores available
in FPGA or ASIC design software. In contrast to prior research, the
presented approach considers the full and realistic fault-model for space
computing, and operates within real-world constraints. The approach
does not require failure-free components within an MPSoC or in the OS,
and does not leave conceptual gaps, e.g., regarding fault detection and
recovery. It is not based upon traditional radiation-hardened processor
cores and does not achieve fault-tolerance through hardware-measures.
We showed that our approach is programmatically simple and requires
little custom code, which can also be implemented in most pre-existing
multi-threading capable OS. Faults can be detected and mitigated using
application provided routines, enabling decisions about an application’s
integrity to be taken by the application developers themselves. As a
consequence, the system designer no longer must struggle to assess the
health of each individual application’s state, and instead can focus on
determining an optimal solution to problems at hand. It allows flexible
fault-detection, mitigation and recovery within COTS MPSoCs, laying
the foundations for FT computing aboard miniaturized satellites, and
helping to bridge the gap between theoretical embedded research and
practical implementation in the space industry. While remaining flexible,
and inducing only a minimal performance overhead, the presented multi-
stage approach offers time-bounded real-time guarantees.
The approach can be well complemented with several other reliability-
improving measures which were integrated into the outlined reference
MPSoC architecture. Preliminary benchmark results of an unoptimized
implementation show a low performance overhead, suggesting a beyond
factor-of-5 performance increase over state-of-the-art radiation-hardened
processors for space use. Our approach allows the host platform to
scale vertically (more powerful processor cores and more interfaces per
tile) as well as horizontally (more tiles), with virtually any modern
processor core. Thereby, we aim to increase acceptance for software-side
FT approaches in the space industry, building trust in hybrid hardware-
software architectures. Thus, our approach is the first integral, real-world
solution to enable the fault-tolerant application with modern MPSoC
designs for critical satellite control applications, thereby enabling the
use of such SoCs in future high-priority space missions.
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